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Many social and biological systems are characterized by enduring
hierarchies, including those organized around prestige in academia, domi-
nance in animal groups, and desirability in online dating. Despite their
ubiquity, the general mechanisms that explain the creation and endurance
of such hierarchies are not well understood. We introduce a generative
model for the dynamics of hierarchies using time-varying networks in
which new links are formed based on the preferences of nodes in the
current network and old links are forgotten over time. The model pro-
duces a range of hierarchical structures, ranging from egalitarianism to
bistable hierarchies, and we derive critical points that separate these
regimes in the limit of long system memory. Distinctively, our model
supports statistical inference, allowing for a principled comparison of gen-
erative mechanisms using data. We apply the model to study hierarchical
structures in empirical data on hiring patterns among mathematicians,
dominance relations among parakeets, and friendships among members of
a fraternity, observing several persistent patterns as well as interpretable
differences in the generative mechanisms favored by each. Our work
contributes to the growing literature on statistically grounded models of
time-varying networks.
introduction
Many human and animal societies are structured by hierarchies—stable sets of
dominance relationships between individuals [Fushing et al., 2011; Hobson et al.,
2018; Hobson and DeDeo, 2015]. Among animals, hierarchical rank may determine
access to resources such as food, grooming, and reproduction [Holekamp and
Strauss, 2016]. Among humans, rank shapes the epistemic capital and employment
prospects of researchers [Clauset et al., 2015; Morgan et al., 2018], susceptibility
of adolescents to bullying [Garandeau et al., 2014], messaging patterns in online
dating [Bruch and Newman, 2018], and influence in group decision-making [Cheng
and Tracy, 2014].
A central question concerns how enduring hierarchies shape and are shaped by
interactions between individuals. Empirical studies have indicated the presence
of a winner effect : an individual who participates in a favorable interaction,
such as winning a fight or receiving an endorsement, increases their likelihood
of being favored in future interactions [Chase et al., 1994; Hogeweg and Hesper,
1983]. Both theoretical work [Bonabeau et al., 1995, 1996; Hemelrijk, 1999;
Ben-Naim and Redner, 2005; Miyaguchi et al., 2020; Pósfai and D’Souza, 2018;
Hickey and Davidsen, 2019; Vehrencamp, 1983; Sánchez-Tójar et al., 2018] and
controlled experiments in humans [Salganik et al., 2006] suggest that winner
effects are sufficient (though not necessary) to form stable hierarchies. Mechanistic
explanations of winner effects vary. A common approach postulates that each
individual possesses an intrinsic strength, which may depend on factors such
as size, skill, or aggression levels. For instance, physiological mechanisms such
as changes in hormone levels following confrontational interactions [Mehta and
Prasad, 2015] can alter an individual’s strength, causing the strong to get stronger.
However, intrinsic strengths are not necessary to produce winner effects. If
a politician endorses a rival candidate, the latter does not become intrinsically
more fit for office; instead, she builds support for her candidacy that may lead
to future endorsements. The fame of the endorser is key: the better-known the
endorser, the more valuable her endorsement. We refer to such prestige by proxy
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as transitive prestige. Since transitive prestige enables hierarchical rank to flow
through interactions between individuals, networks provide a natural lens through
which to study its role. Recent empirical studies have emphasized the networked
nature of hierarchy in biological and social groups [Shizuka and McDonald, 2015;
Ball and Newman, 2013; Pinter-Wollman et al., 2014; Hobson and DeDeo, 2015;
Hobson et al., 2018]. Several theoretical studies [König and Tessone, 2011; König
et al., 2014; Bardoscia et al., 2013; Krause et al., 2013] have also investigated
reinforcing hierarchy using time-varying network models called adaptive networks
[Sayama et al., 2013; Porter, 2020]. In this class of models, edges, representing
interactions, evolve in response to node states and vice versa. Edges tend to
accrue to important or highly central nodes, leading to self-reinforcing hierarchical
network structures. Despite their recent uses, adaptive networks are often difficult
to analyze analytically or compare to empirical data.
We present a novel and flexible adaptive network model of social hierarchy
that addresses these challenges. Winner effects in our model are driven entirely
by social reinforcement rather than intrinsic strengths. We allow arbitrary matrix
functions to determine rank or prestige of nodes in the network, and introduce
parameters governing the behavior of individuals in response to rank. Distinctively
among adaptive networks, our model is amenable both to mathematical analysis
and to statistical inference. We analytically characterize a critical transition
separating egalitarian and hierarchical model states for several choices of ranking
function. We also explore hierarchical patterns in four biological and social data
sets, using our model to perform principled selection between competing ranking
methods in each data set and highlight persistent macroscopic patterns. We
conclude with a discussion of potential model extensions and connections to recent
work on centrality in temporal networks.
modeling emergent hierarchy
In our adaptive network model, new directed edges are formed based on existing,
node-based hierarchy, after which they decay over time. We conceptualize a
directed edge i→ j as an endorsement, in which i affirms that j is fit, prestigious,
or otherwise of high quality. For example, endorsements could capture contests
won by j over i, retweets of j by i, or comparisons in which a third party ranks
j above i. We collect endorsements in a weighted directed network on n nodes
summarized by its adjacency matrix A ∈ Rn×n, where entry aij is the weighted
number of interactions i → j. The matrix A evolves in discrete time via the
iteration
A(t+ 1) = λA(t) + (1− λ)∆(t) . (1)
Here, the update matrix ∆(t) contains new endorsements at time t. The memory
parameter λ ∈ [0, 1] represents the rate with which memories of old endorsements
decay; the smaller the value of λ, the more quickly previous endorsements are
forgotten.
The new endorsements in ∆(t) depend on previous endorsements through a
ranking of the n nodes, which we call the score vector (or just score) s ∈ Rn.
The score vector is the output of a score function σ : A 7→ s ∈ Rn, which may
be any rule that assigns a real number to each node. We focus here on score
functions interpretable as rankings or centrality measures, although this is not
strictly required by our mathematical setup.
We consider three score functions chosen for analytical tractability and rel-
evance in applications. Let Din and Dout be diagonal matrices whose entries
are the weighted in- and out-degrees of the network, i.e., Dinii =
∑
j Aij and
Doutii =
∑
j Aji. The first score function, Root-Degree, assigns score si =
√
Dinii
as a simple function of the number of favorable interactions in which i has partic-
ipated. Other nonlinear transformations of the in-degree are also possible. The
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second score function is PageRank: we define scores s as the PageRank vector of
AT [Brin and Page, 1998], which is a solution to the system[
αpA
T (Dout)−1 + (1− αp)n−1e eT
]
s = s . (2)
Here, αp ∈ [0, 1] is the teleportation parameter, for which we use the customary
value αp = 0.85. The PageRank score of a node is interpretable as the proportion
of time that a random surfer following the network of endorsements would spend
on node i. Finally, the SpringRank score function—inspired by physical springs
[De Bacco et al., 2018]—computes s as the unique solution to the linear system[
Din + Dout − (A + AT ) + αsI
]
s =
[
Din −Dout] e , (3)
with the identity matrix I; the all-ones vector e; and a regularization parameter
αs > 0 ensuring the identifiability of s. Unlike the Root-Degree score, both
PageRank and SpringRank scores model transitive prestige.
Given score vector s, new endorsements ∆ are chosen using a random utility
model, a standard in discrete choice theory which has recently been applied in
models of growing networks [Overgoor et al., 2019]. At time step t, node i is
selected uniformly at random. We suppose that endorsing j has utility uij(s)
for i, which depends on the current scores. In this work, we focus on utilities of
the functional form
uij(s) = β1sj + β2(si − sj)2 , (4)
where we generally assume that β1 > 0 and β2 < 0. The first term models a
preference for prestige, in which nodes tend to endorse others with high scores.
The second term models a proximity preference, in which nodes tend to endorse
others with scores relatively similar to their own. Many other choices of utility
functions are possible; we prove a stability theorem for a large class of these
functions in Appendix A.
FIGURE 1 – Schematic illustration of
our model dynamics. Nodes are ini-
tialized at time t = 1 with a set of
pre-existing endorsements logged in A
(solid arrows) and the score s = σ(A)
is computed (vertical axis). Then,
a new edge logged by ∆ is added
(dashed line). In the next time step
t = 2, old interactions decay by a
factor of λ (grey arrows). The new
endorsement and decay of previous en-
dorsements lead to an updated score
function, which then informs the next
time step.
In the random utility model, node i observes all possible utilities subject to
Gumbel-distributed noise, and then chooses the greatest observed utility. The
probability that i chooses to interact with j then has closed form [Agresti, 2003]
pij (s) =
euij(s)∑n
j=1 e
uij(s)
. (5)
We record this interaction in the update matrix ∆ with entries ∆ij = 1 and
∆i′j′ = 0 for any (i′, j′) 6= (i, j). For simplicity, we assume here that a single
3
endorsement occurs in each time step, although we relax this assumption when
analyzing data. More complex random utility models can lead to more realistic
structures in networks with a growing number of nodes [Gupta and Porter, 2020];
we do not pursue these complications here because our model does not focus on
network growth, and because these complications obstruct analytical insight.
Equations (1) and (5) capture key features of our model. First, the dynamics
in Eq. (1) imply that past interactions decay geometrically at rate λ. This global,
gradual decay contrasts with another rank-based relinking model in which single
edges fully disappear within each time step [König and Tessone, 2011]. Second,
Eq. (5) implies that the likelihood of a node being endorsed at a given time step
depends only on the distribution of previous endorsements and not on intrinsic
strength, fitness, or attractiveness. Those who receive more endorsements and
therefore obtain higher scores are more likely to be endorsed in the future—a
mechanistic instantiation of winner effects via social reinforcement.
Figure 1 shows a schematic view of the model’s dynamics. At time t = 1,
the model is initialized with a small number of endorsements logged by A. The
score vector s is then computed, and a new interaction logged by ∆ is added,
with weight 1− λ. Then, all previous endorsements are discounted by λ. This
process then repeats, with new endorsements gradually replacing old ones in the
system’s memory, and with sequential updates to the score vector s. Figure 1
also depicts in stylized fashion the operation of both a winner effect (β1 > 0),
in which endorsements tend to flow in the direction of increasing score, and a
proximity effect (β2 < 0), in which endorsements tend to flow between nodes of
similar scores. The net effect is that most endorsements are “short hops” up the
hierarchy. As we will discuss, this is a common pattern in empirical data.
FIGURE 2 – Representative dynamics of
the model. Each column shows a pop-
ulation of n = 8 nodes simulated for
2,000 time steps using the SpringRank
score function with λ = 0.995, vary-
ing the preference parameters β1 and
β2. Panels (a), (c), and (e) show the
simulated rank vector γ over time;
different colors track the ranks of dif-
ferent nodes. Panels (b), (d), and (f)
show the adjacency matrix A at time
step t = 2000 for the corresponding
parameter combinations.
Despite its simplicity, the model displays a wide range of behaviors. To
observe them, we define a rank vector γ, whose jth entry γj = n−1
∑
i pij gives
the likelihood that a new endorsement flows to j. We say that the system state
is egalitarian when all ranks γj are equal and hierarchical otherwise. Figure 2
illustrates representative behaviors when the SpringRank score is used. When β1
is relatively small, winner effects are overtaken by noise, and the system settles
into an approximately egalitarian state (Fig. 2a,b). When β1 is relatively large,
persistent hierarchies emerge (Fig.2c-f). Moreover, the distribution and stability of
ranks depend on the strength of proximity effects, modeled by the quadratic term
in the utilities. For β2 = 0 (no proximity preference), a single node garners more
than half of endorsements in a hierarchy with significant fluctuations (Fig. 2c,d).
Adding a proximity preference leads to a marginally more equitable hierarchy
with ranks that are nearly constant in time (Fig. 2e,f).
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the long-memory limit
The behavior observed in Fig. 2 suggests the presence of qualitatively distinct
regimes depending on the value of parameter β1. For small β1 (Fig. 2a), the
winner effect is weak and approximate egalitarianism prevails. For larger β1, a
stronger winner effect enforces a stable hierarchy. We characterize the boundary
between these regimes analytically in the long-memory limit λ→ 1 by defining a
function f which is analogous to a deterministic time-derivative for the dynamics
of our discrete-time stochastic process. Let
f(s,A) = lim
λ→1
E[σ(λA + (1− λ)∆)]− s
1− λ , (6)
where the expectation is taken with respect to ∆. If f(s,A) = 0 for all A, the
score vector s is a fixed point of the model dynamics in expectation. Our choices
of Root-Degree, PageRank, and SpringRank score functions admit closed-form
expressions for f , allowing us to analytically derive the conditions for the stability
of egalitarianism in the limit of long memory.
Theorem 1. For each of the Root-Degree, PageRank, and SpringRank score
functions, f has a unique egalitarian root. This root is linearly stable if and only
if β1 < β∗1 , where
β∗1 =

2
√
n Root-Degree,
n/αp PageRank,
2 + αsn SpringRank.
In Appendix A, we prove Theorem 1 and its generalization, incorporating a
generalized utility function and multiple updates per time step. In each case, the
proof of uniqueness exploits the algebraic structure of the score function, and the
critical value β∗1 is obtained via the linearization of f about the egalitarian state.
Interestingly, only β1 plays a role in the stability of the egalitarian root; β2 does
not.
Figure 3 illustrates the destabilization of egalitarianism predicted by Theorem 1
in the case of n = 8 nodes. Although not required by Theorem 1, we fix β2 = 0 for
simplicity. Curves show fixed points of the model dynamics in the long-memory
limit. We show only fixed points in which nodes separate into two groups, each of
which have identical rank. For β1 < β∗1 , the egalitarian regime is stable and the
long-run state deviates from egalitarianism only slightly. For β1 > β∗1 , in contrast,
the long-run state switches to an inegalitarian, stable fixed point.
In the Root-Degree and PageRank models, there is a single stable inegalitarian
equilibrium with one node absorbing nearly all endorsements (Fig. 3a,b). Interest-
ingly, there is a bistable regime in which both egalitarian and inegalitarian states
are attracting. Whether the system converges to one or the other depends on
initial conditions. The SpringRank model displays qualitatively distinct behavior
(Fig. 3c,d). Past β∗1 , we observe staggered multistable regimes. As β1 increases,
equilibria with multiple elite (i.e., highly ranked) nodes become sequentially un-
stable until eventually only a single elite nodes remains. The long-term behavior
of the system again depends on initial conditions, but now there are many more
possible stable states. This behavior would seem to make the SpringRank score
function especially appropriate for modeling empirical systems with multiple
distinct hierarchical regimes and sensitivity to initial conditions, an intuition
which we confirm empirically in the following section.
hierarchies in data
In addition to being amenable to analytical treatment, our model has a tractable
likelihood function, described in Appendix B. This allows us to study hierarchical
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FIGURE 3 – Bifurcations in models
with Root-Degree, PageRank, and
SpringRank score functions with
β2 = 0. Points give the value of
the rank vector γ averaged over the
final 500 time-steps of a 5 × 104-step
simulation with n = 8 nodes, memory
parameter λ = 0.9995, and varying
β1 specified by the horizontal axis.
Solid curves show stationary points of
the long-memory dynamics obtained
by numerically solving the equation
f(s,A) = 0, subject to the restriction
that nodes separate into two groups
with identical ranks in each. Black
curves are linearly stable, while grey
curves are unstable. Stability was de-
termined by studying the spectrum
of the Jacobian matrix of f . Verti-
cal lines give the critical value β∗1 at
which the egalitarian solution becomes
linearly unstable according to Theo-
rem 1.
structures in empirical data using principled statistical inference. The likelihood
function not only supports maximum-likelihood parameter estimates of λ, β1,
and β2 but also enables direct comparisons of different score functions in a
statistically rigorous framework: score functions with higher likelihoods provide
more predictive low-dimensional summaries of observed interactions. This in turn
allows us to explore the relative value of competing mechanistic explanations of
observed data.
Several mathematical features of the model facilitate the exploration of real
data. First, the predictive distribution Eq. (5) is in the linear exponential family,
making the estimation of β a convex optimization with a unique solution. Second,
the estimation problem in λˆ is in general nonconvex, but can be tractably solved
via first-order optimization methods with multiple starting points. Finally, while
model likelihoods evaluated on training data may in principle be inflated due to
overfitting, our model uses only three parameters to fit hundreds or thousands of
observations, suggesting that overfitting is not a major concern.
We conducted a comparative study of model behavior on four data sets: an
academic exchange network in math, two networks of parakeet interactions, and a
network of friendships among members of a fraternity. The Math PhD Exchange
data set is extracted from The Mathematics Genealogy Project [North Dakota
State University Department of Mathematics, 2020; Taylor et al., 2017]. Nodes
are universities. An interaction i → j at time t occurs when a mathematician
who received their degree from university j at time t supervises one or more PhD
theses at university i. This event is a proxy for university j hiring a graduate
from university i at a time near t. We view this as an endorsement by j that
graduates of i are of high quality [Clauset et al., 2015]. We restricted our analysis
to the activity of the 70 institutions that placed the most graduates between 1960
and 2000. Doing so helped to avoid singularities produced by institutions with no
placements early in the time period and to minimize temporal boundary effects
associated with the beginning and end of data collection.
The two Parakeet data sets [Hobson and DeDeo, 2015] record aggression events
in two distinct groups of birds studied over four observation quarters (weeks). An
interaction i→ j at time t occurs when parakeet i loses a fight to parakeet j in
period t. Since there are just four observation periods, estimates of the memory
parameter λ should be approached with caution.
Lastly, the Newcomb Fraternity data set [Nordlie, 1958; Newcomb, 1961] doc-
uments friendships among members of a fraternity at the University of Michigan.
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Each week during a fall semester, excluding a week for fall break, each of 17
cohabiting brothers was asked to rank every other brother according to friendship
preference. An endorsement i → j is logged when brother i ranks j among
his top k = 5 peers (small changes to k did not significantly alter the results).
While friendship is often viewed as a symmetric relationship, expressed friendship
preferences may be asymmetric [Carley and Krackhardt, 1996].
Root-Degree PageRank SpringRank
Math PhD λˆ 0.87 (0.01) 0.96 (0.01) 0.91 (0.01)
Exchange βˆ1 1.28 (0.02) 0.74 (0.01) 2.99 (0.04)
(N = 6,019) βˆ2 -0.18 (0.01) -0.07 (0.00) -1.12 (0.04)
L -14,379 -15,001 -14,927
Parakeets (G1) λˆ 0.97 (0.08) 0.59 (0.08) 0.67 (0.14)
(N = 838) βˆ1 0.84 (0.05) 1.82 (0.08) 3.03 (0.16)
βˆ2 -0.12 (0.01) -0.50 (0.03) -1.74 (0.12)
L -1,106 -1,053 -964
Parakeets (G2) λˆ 0.42 (0.07) 0.13 (0.03) 0.40 (0.06)
(N = 961) βˆ1 0.62 (0.03) 0.82 (0.04) 2.86 (0.14)
βˆ2 -0.06 (0.01) -0.12 (0.01) -1.46 (0.12)
L -975 -1029 -924
Newcomb λˆ 0.56 (0.13) 0.81 (0.19) 0.71 (0.14)
Fraternity βˆ1 0.95 (0.05) 1.21 (0.07) 2.33 (0.14)
(N = 1,428) βˆ2 -0.08 (0.03) -0.25 (0.05) -0.86 (0.16)
L -1,850 -1,865 -1,841
Table 4 – Parameter estimates and likeli-
hood scores using each of three score
functions for our four study data sets.
Parentheses give standard errors for
each parameter estimate. For each
data set, the largest log-likelihood is
indicated in bold. All parameter es-
timates are statistically distinct from
zero at 95% confidence. N gives the
total number of interactions in the
data.
We studied these data using the Root-Degree, PageRank, and SpringRank
score functions. Table 4 summarizes our results, including parameter estimates;
standard errors (obtained by inverting the numerically-calculated Fisher infor-
mation matrix); and optimized log-likelihoods for each combination of score and
data set. Several features stand out. In all four data sets and across all three
score functions, we find βˆ1 > 0 and βˆ2 < 0. This suggests a persistent pattern in
time-dependent hierarchies: while endorsements do flow upward (βˆ1 > 0), nodes
are more likely to endorse those close to them in rank (βˆ2 < 0). Endorsements
tend to flow a few rungs up the ladder—not directly to the top. The reasons
for this pattern likely vary across data set. In the Math PhD Exchange, this
may indicate that low-ranked schools struggle to recruit graduates of high-ranked
ranked ones due to a limited supply of elite candidates. In parakeet populations,
proximal aggression may facilitate inference of dominance hierarchies through
transitive inference [Hobson and DeDeo, 2015]. In Newcomb’s Fraternity, we
postulate that implicit social norms may encourage friendships between those of
similar standing. Similar results have been reported in static social network data
among adolescents [Ball and Newman, 2013]. Thus, while we do not attribute
this pattern in the parameter estimates to a “universal” mechanism, we suggest
its persistence as an interesting observation worthy of future study.
Because different score functions capture distinct qualitative features of the
data, quantitative comparisons yield insights into the generating mechanisms at
work. In general, parameters from models using differing score functions should
not be directly compared, since these parameters are sensitive to the scale of the
score vector. However, we can compare models on the basis of their likelihoods.
In the Math PhD Exchange, the Root-Degree model was strongly favored over
either SpringRank or PageRank. In the context of this data set, the Root-Degree
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score is a measure of faculty production: a school that places more candidates
has a higher score, regardless of the prestige of the institutions at which the
candidates land. The strong fit from the Root-Degree score is consistent with
previous findings that raw faculty production plays a major role in structuring
the hierarchy of academic hiring within computer science, business, and history
[Clauset et al., 2015]. As the authors of [Clauset et al., 2015], transitive prestige
also plays an important role. It would be of significant interest to extend our
study to include multiple score functions, enabling an inferential analysis of the
relative roles of production and transitive prestige.
In contrast, the SpringRank score was favored by large margins in both parakeet
data sets and by a smaller margin in the fraternity data set, suggesting that
transitive prestige plays a more prominent role. Among parakeets, it may matter
not only how many confrontations one wins but also against whom, with victories
over high-ranking birds counting more towards one’s own prestige. This finding
is consistent with those of [Hobson and DeDeo, 2015], who found using different
methodology that parakeet behavior suggests the ability to draw sophisticated,
transitive inferences about location in the hierarchy. Similarly, in Newcomb’s
Fraternity, friendships with highly-ranked brothers may confer greater prestige
than those with lower-ranked ones.
In addition to the likelihoods, the memory estimate λˆ can be meaningfully
compared across models and data sets. Since the model assumes that the impact of
past endorsements decays at rate λ, the quantity t1/2 = − log(2)/ log(λˆ) represents
the half-life of system information according to the inferred dynamics, in units
of observation periods. In the Math PhD Exchange, the favored Root-Degree
score gave a half-life of t1/2 ≈ 5 years. It is suggestive that this is a common
length of time to complete a PhD in mathematics under the American system.
In the Parakeets data, the half-life estimated under SpringRank is t1/2 ≈ 1.7
weeks for the first group and t1/2 ≈ 0.8 weeks for the second. The small number
of observation periods implies that these estimates should be approached with
caution. Finally, in the Newcomb Fraternity, the SpringRank half-life was t1/2 ≈ 2
weeks. This suggests that the friendships in this data set evolved on timescales
much shorter than the full semester. This likely reflects the fact that the brothers
did not know each other prior to data collection, requiring them to form their
social relationships from scratch.
Our model also assigns intepretable, time-dependent ranks to empirical data,
as illustrated in Fig. 5 using the Math PhD Exchange as an example. The raw
placement share (Fig.5a) and Root-Degree model (Fig.5b) show strong qualitative
agreement, with institutions that place the most candidates occupying higher
ranks. Due to the relatively large estimates λˆ, both the Root-Degree and PageRank
models (Fig. 2b-c) produce smoother rank trajectories than the purely-descriptive
placement share with 8-year rolling average. In contrast, the SpringRank score
generates qualitatively different trajectories that are less sensitive to raw volume
(Fig.5d). For instance, SpringRank places Harvard at the top over most of the time
period, while the other scores prefer MIT. This difference reflects SpringRank’s
sensitivity to where Harvard’s graduates were placed, a consideration which Root-
Degree entirely ignores. Similarly, SpringRank places Chicago and Yale noticeably
higher than Wisconsin-Madison, despite all three having similar numbers of
placements.
discussion
We have proposed a simple and flexible model of persistent hierarchy as an
emergent feature of networked endorsements with feedback. When the preferences
for high status exceeds a critical value, egalitarian states destabilize and hierarchies
emerge. The location of this transition depends on the structure of the score
function and of the node’s preferences. Our findings emphasize that winner
8
Fig. 5 – Visualization of evolving rank-
ing functions in the Math PhD Ex-
change. (a): Fraction of all place-
ments (number of graduates hired)
from each school, shown as a moving
average with bin-width 8 years for
visualization purposes. (b): Inferred
rank vector γ as a function of time
using the Root-Degree score function.
(c-d): As in (b), with PageRank and
SpringRank score functions, respec-
tively. Parameters for panels (b-d) are
shown in the first section of Table 4.
effects do not require internal, fitness-enhancing feedback mechanisms. Social
reinforcement through prestige preference is sufficient to generate social hierarchies.
Crucially, our model has a tractable likelihood function, supporting principled
statistical inference of parameters—for both preferences and memory strength—
from empirical data. In the four data sets analyzed, we found that links are
typically formed in alignment with the hierarchy (βˆ1 > 0) but that they are
preferentially created to other nodes with similar ranks (βˆ2 < 0). The likelihood
also opens the door to model selection to determine relevant score functions. We
found that networked ranking methods that capture transferable prestige are
preferred over non-networked methods in some but not all systems. Due to its
flexibility, our framework can be applied to additional data sets, score functions,
and/or preference models to test the generality of these empirical observations.
There are limitations to our approach. First, we specified a fixed parametric
form for the utilities with Eq. (4) and Gumbel-distributed noise with Eq. (5).
Other choices may be more justified in particular applications, ideally informed
by domain-specific considerations. A benefit of our inferential framework is
that these choices can be quantitatively evaluated and compared. Future work
that systematically explores the most appropriate functional forms in systems
from diverse scientific domains would be especially useful. Second, all nodes are
assumed to use identical preference parameters β1, β2 and score vector s when
computing their utilities. The latter is an especially strong assumption, since it
requires each node to have global knowledge of the endorsement network, or at
least of the score vector. This is unlikely to be true in real systems, and should
be regarded as a modeling device. Future work, along the lines of [Hobson and
DeDeo, 2015], could explore the interplay between the cognitive capabilities of
individuals represented by nodes and the information available to them in the
formation of social hierarchies.
Our model suggests several other important avenues for further work. A
crucial step would be to extend extant network-based models [König and Tessone,
2011; König et al., 2014; Krause et al., 2013] so that their parameters could be
statistically learned from data. This would enable comparative validation of
different modeling frameworks. Studies of the relationship between measures
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of time-dependent centralities [Taylor et al., 2017, 2019; Liao et al., 2017] and
dynamic models of hierarchy would also be valuable. In particular, there is
an important methodological issue that arises in the theory of time-dependent
centralities: different reasonable ranking methods can yield directionally different
orderings of nodes when applied to the same data set [Mariani and Lü, 2020].
Their performance on external validation tasks, such as the prediction of central
nodes in spreading processes [Lü et al., 2016], may also vary significantly. Because
the theories of centrality and generative networks have evolved largely separately,
the suitability of a centrality metric for a given dynamic system can be difficult to
evaluate. Our inferential approach offers an internal validation task for centrality
in temporal networks: good methods are those which most effectively predict the
future evolution of the system. This approach enables us to not only compare
different score and utility functions in a principled manner but also explore their
relative importance in observed networks. For instance, one could study the
relative influence of degree-based and SpringRank scores by incorporating both
into our model and then analyzing their distinct coefficients. This would enable a
study of how different forms of centrality and importance combine to govern the
evolution of interaction networks. We anticipate that fruitful dialogue between
centrality theory and generative models of time-varying networks will deepen
our understanding of the feedback mechanism between local interactions and
hierarchical structures.
software
A repository containing our data, model implementation, and figure generation
scripts is available at https://github.com/PhilChodrow/prestige_reinforcement.
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gender representation in cited work
Recent work in several fields of science has identified gender bias in citation
practices—papers by women and other minorities are systematically under-cited
in their fields [Mitchell et al., 2013; Dion et al., 2018; Caplar et al., 2017; Maliniak
et al., 2013; Dworkin et al., 2020]. Gender bias can arise through explicit and
implicit bias against a personâĂŹs known gender identity, or against a name
commonly used by members of a marginalized gender identity [MacNell et al.,
2015; Paludi and Strayer, 1985; Moss-Racusin et al., 2012]. In this work, we
proactively sought to include relevant citations by non-male authors.
We manually gender-coded the authors in the works cited according to personal
acquaintance, instances of pronoun usage online, or first name. This method is
limited: names and pronouns may not be indicative of gender identity; gender
identity may change over time; and our manual coding is inherently subjective
and subject to error. We focused on the first and last authors because typically,
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though not always, the former is the leading researcher and the latter the senior
author in the disciplines included in our references. Of the works cited in the
main text, 29% had a non-male first author and 13% had a non-male last author.
Of those with at least two authors, 38% had either a non-male first author or a
non-male last author.
This statement was modeled after those found in [Torres et al., 2020; Dworkin
et al., 2020]. We join those authors and many others in calling for collective effort
to promote equitable practices in science.
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SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
Emergence of Hierarchy in Networked Endorsement Dynamics
a linear stability
In this section, we prove a set of linear stability results that generalize Theorem 1
in the main text. Our generalizations account for (a) nonlinear features and (b)
multiple updates per round.
Throughout this section, we consider a utility function of the form
uij(s) =
k∑
`=1
β`φ
`
ij(s) , (7)
where each φ` : Rn 7→ Rn×n is a smooth feature map; β` ∈ R is a preference
parameter indicating relative importance of the `th feature; and φ`ij(s) is the
ijth entry of φ`(s). We collect the parameters β in a vector β ∈ Rk. The utility
function in (4) from the main text is a special case with linear feature map
φ1ij(s) = sj , and quadratic feature map, φ2ij(s) = (si − sj)2. We also define the
rate matrix G = [n−1pij ], whose (i, j)th entry gives the probability that, in a
given time step, node i chosen uniformly at random endorses node j (see (5) in
the main text for the definition of pij).
Since we aim to characterize the linear stability of egalitarian fixed points, we
will consider the Jacobian of the rank vector γ evaluated at egalitarian fixed points.
We will therefore evaluate the Jacobian at s0 = θe, where θ ∈ R. By definition,
γ = n−1GTe = n−1
∑
i γi, where γi is the ith column of G. Differentiating and
applying the chain rule, we have
∂γ(s0)
∂s
=
∑
i
(
Γi − γiγTi
) k∑
`=1
β`
∂φ`i
∂s
,
where Γi = diagγi and φ`i·(s0) is the ith row of the `th feature map evaluated at
s0. At s0 = θe, G = n−1E. It follows that γi = n−1e and Γi = n−1I. We thus
have
∂γ(s0)
∂s
= n−1(I− n−1E)
n∑
i=1
k∑
`=1
β`
∂φ`i·(s0)
∂s
, M(s0;β) . (8)
We will express our primary results in terms of this matrix.
When writing proofs involving dynamics, we will typically repress the time-
argument of quantities like s and A. When time step t is implied, we will use the
somewhat informal notation δs = s(t + 1) − s(t) and δA = A(t + 1) −A(t) to
denote the increments of these and other quantities in the current time step.
A.1 DEGREE SCORES
Theorem 2 (Stable Egalitarianism with Degree Scores). When σ(A) = s = ATe,
the vector s0 = de is a root of f , where d = mn , and is the only egalitarian root.
Furthermore, s0 is linearly stable in the long-memory limit if and only if M(s0;β)
has eigenvalues strictly smaller than 1m .
Proof. We first derive the functional form of f . We can write
E[s(t+ 1)|A(t)] = E[A(t+ 1)|A(t)]Te
= λA(t)e + (1− λ)E[∆(t)]Te
= λA(t)e + (1− λ)mn−1G(t)Te .
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Inserting this expression into (6), and recognizing n−1G(t)e = γ(t), we have
f(s) = mn−1E[G]e−A(t)e = mγ − s .
We can now check that s0 is indeed the unique egalitarian root of f . Suppose that
s = se for some scalar s. Then,
f(s) = mγ(s)− s = (mn−1 − s)e ,
which is only equal to zero when s = mn , as needed.
Now computing derivatives, we have
∂f(s)
∂s
= mM(s;β)− I .
This matrix has strictly negative eigenvalues provided that the eigenvalues of
M(s0;β) are strictly smaller than 1m , completing the proof.
Corrolary 1. Using the Root-Degree score function, s0 = mn e is a linearly stable
fixed point of f if and only if β < 2
√
n
m .
Proof. It is convenient to treat the operation of taking the square root as part of
the feature map, rather than part of the score function. We therefore suppose
that sj is the in-degree of node j and that φj(s) =
√
sj . Computing from (8), we
obtain
M(s0;β) =
1
2
n−1√
d
β(I− n−1E) .
This matrix again has a zero eigenvalue associated with the direction e. For
any direction v ⊥ e, there is an eigenvalue 12 n
−1√
d
β. From Theorem 2, s0 will be
linearly stable provided that
1
m
>
1
2
n−1√
d
β .
or
β < 2
√
d
n
m
= 2
√
n
m
,
as required.
A.2 PAGERANK SCORES
The PageRank score [Brin and Page, 1998; Page et al., 1999] is the solution s of
the linear system [
αAT (Do)−1 + (1− α)n−1E] s = s , (9)
where Do = diag(Ae). The Perron-Frobenius Theorem [Horn and Johnson, 2012]
ensures that s is strictly positive entrywise. We assume s to be normalized so
that sTe = 1, in which case s is interpretable as the equilibrium distribution of a
random walk with the transition matrix given in brackets.
In the case of PageRank, it is difficult to derive a result for general features
and we therefore work directly with the PageRank model with linear features.
Theorem 3. The vector s0 = n−1e is the unique egalitarian root of f under
PageRank scores. In the PageRank-Linear model, the egalitarian root is linearly
stable if and only if β < nα .
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Proof. Uniqueness is a direct consequence of normalization: if s = θe and eT s = 1,
then we must have θ = n−1.
We next obtain a necessary condition describing roots of f . We start with a
useful simplification. At any fixed point of f , we must have Do = n−1I. This is
because, at any such fixed point, we must have A = G, and nG is row-stochastic.
For the purposes of analysis in the long-memory limit, we can therefore consider
s to be defined by the simplified equation[
αnAT + (1− α)n−1E] s = s . (10)
In the next time step, we will have[
αn(AT + δAT ) + (1− α)n−1E] (s + δs) = s + δs .
Expanding and canceling yields[
αnAT + (1− α)n−1E] δs + αn(δAT )s + o(1− λ) = δs .
The term o(1 − λ) includes terms involving the product (δAT )(δs), and relies
on the fact that δs is a smooth function of A. Rearranging and dropping the
asymptotic term, we obtain, in the long memory limit,[
I− αnAT − (1− α)n−1E] δs = αn(δAT )s . (11)
This expression gives an implicit representation of f via the relation f(s,A) =
limλ→1
E[δs]
1−λ . We can therefore enforce f(s,A) = 0 by setting E[δs] = 0, obtaining
the necessary condition E[δAT ]s = 0 for roots of f . Expanding this condition
yields,
0 = E[δAT ]s = (1− λ)(GT −AT )s .
Inserting (10) and rearranging yields the nonlinear system[
GT + α−1(1− α)n−2E] s = α−1n−1s . (12)
It is straightforward to show that α−1n−1 is the largest eigenvalue of the matrix
on the righthand side. This allows us to solve (12) iteratively, by alternating
between solving for s via a standard eigenvalue solver and updating G with the
new value of s. This is the method implemented in the accompanying software
and used to generate equilibria in Figure 3.
In order to derive the linear stability criterion, we divide both sides of (11) by
1− λ and differentiate with respect to s, obtaining[
I− αnAT − (1− α)n−1E]J(s) = αn ∂
∂s
[
GT s−AT s] .
After inserting (10) and simplifying, we have[
I− αnAT − (1− α)n−1E]J(s) = αn ∂
∂s
[
GT s− α−1n−1s + α−1(1− α)n−2Es]
= αn
∂
∂s
[
GT s− α−1n−1s] .
The second line follows from the normalization of s, which implies that Es = e, a
constant vector which does not depend on s. Differentiating the righthand side
then yields[
I− αnAT − (1− α)n−1E]J(s) = αn [GT + (eT s)n−1 ∂γ
∂s
]
− I
= αn
[
GT + n−1
∂γ
∂s
]
− I .
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Evaluated at the egalitarian solution s0 = n−1e, this becomes[
I− αnAT − (1− α)n−1E]J(s0) = αn−1E + αM(s0;β)− I .
To complete the argument, we note that, at the egalitarian solution of our
model dynamics, A = n−2E. Inserting and simplifying, we have[
I− αn−1E]J(s0) = αn−1E + αM(s0;β)− I .
Provided that α < 1, the premultiplying matrix on the lefthand side is invertible,
and
[
I− αn−1E]−1 = I + α(1− α)−1n−1E. This matrix has a single eigenvalue
1 + α(1 − α) with eigenvector e, and additional eigenvalues equal to unity in
orthogonal directions. We then have
J(s0) = α
[
I + α(1− α)−1n−1E]M(s0;β)− I .
In the PageRank-Linear model, M(s0;β) = βn−1(I− n−1E), and we therefore
have
J(s0) = αβn
−1 [I + α(1− α)−1n−1E] (I− n−1E)− I .
We can now read off the eigenvalues of J(s0) analytically. The eigenvector e has
eigenvalue −1, while any vector orthogonal to e has eigenvalue αβn−1 − 1. This
latter eigenvalue is strictly negative if and only if β < nα , as was to be shown.
A.3 SPRINGRANK SCORES
We return to the general formalism of score functions and features introduced at
the beginning of this section.
A SpringRank vector s for a matrix A with regularization α ∈ R is a solution
to the linear system[
Di + Do − (A + AT ) + αI] s = di − do. (13)
where, di = eTA, do = ATe, Di = diag(di), and Do = diag(do). When α > 0,
(3) is invertible and s is therefore unique. Thus, throughout this section we will
assume that α > 0, and correspondingly refer to s as “the” SpringRank vector of
A. It is convenient to define Lα = Di + Do − (A + AT ) + αI and Λ = Di −Do,
in which case the SpringRank relation reads Lαs = Λe.
Theorem 4 (Stable Egalitarianism with SpringRank Scores). When σ is the
SpringRank map, the vector s0 = 0 is a fixed point of f , and is the only egalitarian
fixed point of the dynamics. This fixed point is linearly stable in the long-memory
limit if and only if the matrix
M(0;β)− 2n−1(I− n−1E)
has eigenvalues strictly smaller than αnm .
We will break the proof into a series of three lemmas. The first lemma
calculates the analytical form of f . The second shows that s0 = 0 is the unique
egalitarian fixed point of the long-memory limiting dynamics f . The third gives
the criterion for linear stability.
Lemma 1. The deterministic approximant f for the SpringRank vector is given
by
f(s,A) = s + L−1α
(−αs−m (n−1LGs− (n−1e− γ))) , (14)
where LG = Γ + n−1I− (G + GT ).
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Proof. Let us fix an implicit time step t. Here and below, we use the notational
template δM = M(t+ 1)−M(t) to refer to increments in various quantities under
the dynamics (1). For example, δA = A(t+ 1)−A(t) refers to the increment in
A under the dynamics. We compute directly
δA = (λ− 1)(A−∆)
δDo = (λ− 1)(Do − diag(∆e))
δDi = (λ− 1)(Di − diag(∆Te)) .
We can also explicitly write out formulae for the increments in Lα and Λ:
δΛ = δDi − δDo
= (λ− 1) [Di −Do + diag((∆−∆T )e)]
= (λ− 1) [Λ + diag((∆−∆T )e)] , (15)
δLα = δD
i + δDo − (δA + δAT )
= (λ− 1) [Di + Do − diag(∆Te + ∆e)− (A + AT ) + ∆ + ∆T ]
= (λ− 1) [L− diag(∆Te + ∆e) + ∆ + ∆T ]
, (λ− 1) [L− L∆] , (16)
where we have given a name to the Laplacian L∆ = diag(∆Te+∆e)−∆T −∆ of
∆. Note that δLα does not depend on α, and we therefore simply write δL = δLα.
We can now formulate a simple condition for equilibrium in expectation. We
have
(Lα + δL)(s + δs) = (Λ + δΛ)e .
Subtracting the SpringRank relation Lαs = Λe from each side of this expression,
we obtain
(Lα + δL)δs = (δΛ)e− (δL)s .
Since δL = O(1 − λ), the lefthand matrix is invertible in for small λ provided
that α > 0. We therefore obtain
δs =
(
L−1α +O(1− λ)
)
((δΛ)e− (δL)s)
= L−1α ((δΛ)e− (δL)s) +O((1− λ)2) .
The term O((1− λ)2) arises from the product of O(1− λ) and the copy of (λ− 1)
within δΛ and δL. Taking expectations,
E[δs] = L−1α (E[δΛ]e− E[δL]s) +O((1− λ)2) .
We next insert the expressions (15) and (16) and use the fact that E[∆] = mG.
This gives
E[δs] = (1− λ)L−1α
(
[L−mLG] s−
[
Λ +m · diag((G−GT )e)] e)+O((1− λ)2) .
We can simplify this expression by recalling that (L + αI)s = Λe by definition,
as well as the identities Ge = n−1e and GTe = γ. Inserting these identities and
simplifying yields
= (1− λ)L−1α
(−αs−m (LGs + (n−1e− γ)))+O((1− λ)2) .
We now construct f , obtaining Since E[δs] = E[σ(λA + (1− λ)∆)], we can write
f(s,A) = s + lim
λ→1
E[δs]
1− λ
= s− L−1α
[
αs +m
(
LGs + (n
−1e− γ))] ,
as was to be shown.
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Lemma 2. When σ is the SpringRank map, the vector s0 = 0 is a root of f , and
is the only egalitarian fixed point.
Proof. To show that s0 = 0 is a fixed point of f , it suffices to insert this solution
into (14) and simplify, noting that, when s = 0, γ = n−1e. To show that it is the
unique egalitarian root realizable as a SpringRank score, suppose that se were a
SpringRank score for some s 6= 0. Inserting this into (3) and using the fact that e
is a zero eigenvector of the unregularized Laplacian, we would have
αse = di − do .
The total in-degree must equal the total out-degree. Pre-multiplying by e therefore
zeros out the righthand, leaving:
αseTe = αsn = 0 ,
which is a contradiction unless s = 0.
Lemma 3. The egalitarian root s = 0 is a linearly stable root of the SpringRank
dynamics in the long-memory limit if and only if the matrix
M(0;β)− 2n−1(I− n−1E)
has eigenvalues strictly smaller than αm .
Proof. We need to compute J(s0), the Jacobian matrix of f at s0 = 0. The fixed
point will be stable provided that J(s0) has strictly negative eigenvalues. To
compute this Jacobian, we compute derivatives in (14). Doing so and applying
the product rule, we have
∂f(s)
∂s
= I− L−1α
(
αI +m
(
n−1
∂(LGs)
∂s
− ∂γ
∂s
))
.
We calculate ∂LG∂s in Equation (17), now obtaining
∂f(s)
∂s
= I− L−1α
(
αI +m
(
n−1
[
LG + Σ
∂γ
∂s
− ∂γ
∂s
(ST + (eT s)I)
]
− ∂γ
∂s
))
.
Evaluating this expression at s = 0, we have
J(0) = −L−1α
(
αI +m
(
n−1LG − ∂γ(0)
∂s
))
,
where LG must also be evaluated at s = 0. We have G(0) = n−1E, which implies
LG = 2(I− n−1E). We insert this expression and the formula for ∂γ∂s given in (8),
obtaining
J(0) = −L−1α
[
αI +mn−1(I− n−1E)
(
2I−
n∑
i=1
k∑
`=1
β`
∂φ`i(s0)
∂s
)]
.
Since Lα is symmetric and positive-definite, L−1α is as well. The stability of the
egalitarian fixed point is therefore determined by the eigenvalues of the matrix
inside the brackets. Multiplying by nm−1, we find that a necessary and sufficient
condition is that the matrix
(I− n−1E)
(
2I−
n∑
i=1
k∑
`=1
β`
∂φ`i(s0)
∂s
)
= M(0;β)− 2n−1(I− n−1E)
have eigenvalues no larger than αm , completing the proof.
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Corrolary 2. In the SpringRank-Linear model, s0 = 0 is a linearly stable fixed
point of f if and only if β < 2 + αnm .
Proof. It suffices to specialize Theorem 4 to the case of linear features. In
particular, we have M(0;β) = βn−1(I − n−1E). We therefore require that the
matrix
βn−1(I− n−1E)− 2n−1(I− n−1E) = n−1(β − 2)(I− n−1E)
have eigenvalues smaller than αm . We can compute the eigenvalues of this matrix
analytically – there is a zero eigenvalue corresponding to the vector e. Then, any
vector v ⊥ e is also an eigenvector with eigenvalue n−1(β − 2). We therefore
require n−1(β − 2) < αm , or β < 2 + αnm , completing the argument.
Lemma 4. We have
∂LGs
∂s
= LG + Σ
∂γ
∂s
− ∂γ
∂s
(ST + (eT s)I) . (17)
Proof. We first compute the derivatives ∂(Gs)∂s and
∂(GT s)
∂s . The ith component of
Gs is vi =
∑
j γjsj . The product rule for scalar functions of vectors gives the ith
row of the derivative:
∂Gsi
∂s
=
∑
j
γjej +
∑
j
sj
∂γj
∂s
= γ +
∑
j
sj
∂γj
∂s
.
Written in matrix notation, the first term is G. To write the second term in
matrix form, note that we need to multiply ∂γ∂s by the matrix each of whose
columns is a copy of s. This matrix is ST . We therefore obtain
∂(Gs)
∂s
= G +
∂γ
∂s
ST .
To compute the second derivative, note that GT s = γ(eT s), with ith component
γie
T s. Using the product rule for scalar functions of vectors, we have
∂
∂s
γie
T s = γie + (e
T s)
∂γi
∂s
.
The first term will become the matrix whose ith row is γi, i.e. GT . This yields
∂(GT s)
∂s
= GT + (eT s)
∂γ
∂s
.
Combining these expressions yields our formula for ∂LGs∂s :
∂LGs
∂s
=
∂
∂s
[
Γs + s−Gs−GT s]
= Γ + Σ
∂γ
∂s
+ I−
(
G +
∂γ
∂s
ST + GT + (eT s)
∂γ
∂s
)
= LG + Σ
∂γ
∂s
− ∂γ
∂s
(ST + (eT s)I) ,
as was to be shown.
b parameter estimation
Throughout this section, we use the shorthand {A(t)} = {A(t)}τt=0 to refer to
temporal sequences of matrices up to fixed time τ . We now describe a simple
maximum-likelihood model for learning the parameter β from a sequence of
observations {∆(t)}. By construction, ∆(τ) depends on the sequence of state
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matrices {A(t)} only through the most recent state A(τ). We may therefore factor
the probability of observing the data given a set of undetermined parameters as:
P({∆(t)}; A(0), λ,β) =
τ∏
t=0
P(∆(t); A(t),β) .
While the parameter λ has disappeared from the righthand side, this expression
is nevertheless implicitly a function of λ since the value of A(τ) given A(τ − 1)
and ∆(τ − 1) depends on λ.
Let us write out a typical factor on the righthand side. Let ki = ∆i·, and let
Ki = e
Tki. Then,
P(∆(t); A(τ),β) =
n∏
i=1
 Ki∏n
j=1 kij !
n∏
j=1
(γij(t))
kij
 .
Taking logarithms and collecting terms that do not depend on β or λ into a
constant C(t), we obtain
logP(∆(t); A(t),β) =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
kij(t) log γij(t) + C(t).
The log-likelihood of the full sequence is then
L(λ,β; {∆(t)},A(0)) , logP({∆(t)}; A(0), λ,β) =
τ∑
t=0
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
kij(t) log γij(t) + C,
where C =
∑τ
t=0 C(t). The dependence on β appears through γij .
The maximum likelihood approach encourages us to choose as parameter
estimates λˆ and βˆ the values
λˆ, βˆ = argmax
λ,β
L(λ,β; {∆(t)},A(0)) . (18)
Standard theory of maximum likelihood in exponential families implies that L is
convex in β for any fixed λ. This implies that, when λˆ is known, we can solve for βˆ
via standard first- or second-order optimization methods. Let L∗(λ; {∆(t)},A(0))
be the optimized loglikelihood for fixed λ. We then complete the maximum
likelihood scheme by optimizing L∗ with respect to λ, which our accompanying
software does via a customized hill-climbing algorithm. In general, L∗ may fail
to be convex as a function of λ, and we therefore perform multiple runs with
different initial values of λ in order to find the global maximum.
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